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Abstract—IP-based Surveillance systems protect industrial facilities,
railways, gas stations, and even one’s own home. Therefore, unautho-
rized access to these systems has serious security implications. In this
survey, we analyze the systems (1) threat agents, (2) attack goals, (3)
practical attacks, (4) possible attack outcomes, and (5) provide example
attack vectors.
1 INTRODUCTION
THESE days, video surveillance systems can be found ev-erywhere. They are in the streets, at train stations, work-
places, factories, and even at home. Intelligent applications
have made large surveillance networks practical to manage
an utilize. For example, technology for facial recognition,
identifying threats, event-detection, tracking objects, and
rapidly investigating incidents, can be scaled to thousands
of cameras over large geographical areas.
Over the last few decades, surveillance technologies
have evolved from analog systems to packet switched sys-
tems (over IPv4 & IPv6 networks). Moreover, video surveil-
lance systems have become affordable due to the popular
and pervasive Internet of Things (IoT). As a result, the
market for security devices in connected homes has grown
by a factor of 17 over the last few years [1]. Due to their
convince, practicality, and affordability, video surveillance
systems have become ubiquitous in our daily lives.
Unfortunately, in recent years, these systems and their
components have been the target of cyber attacks. For exam-
ple, they have been the target of distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks, exploited to invade the users’ privacy, and
even to mine cyrpto-currency. These systems have also been
recruited into botnets to perform nefarious tasks. For exam-
ple, in 2014, the infamous Mira botnet targeted surveillance
systems, and infected over 600,000 devices worldwide [2].
Through Shodan.io and Censys.io queries of well known
manufacturers, we found over 1 million surveillance cam-
eras and over 125 thousand surveillance servers exposed
to the Internet. Of these devices, 90% do not have secure
login portals (use HTTP and not HTTPS). Moreover, ap-
proximately 8% have open SSH and Telnet ports, 3% have
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exposed MySQL databases, and at least 1.7% of these de-
vices are still vulnerable to the HeartBleed SSL vulnerability
discovered in 2012. Even large video surveillance manu-
facturers have exposed products. For example, Samsung’s
CCTV Server has at least 83,035 exposed devices, where 86%
of them use HTTP login portals, and 1,604 have ssh ports
open. Moreover, HikVision, the surveillance manufacture
with the largest market share of 24.7% has at least 260,415
exposed devices where only 53 of them had HTTPS enabled,
but with self-signed certificates. These statistics emphasize
the poor state of security of IP-based surveillance systems.
In this article, we will review the cyber security of
modern surveillance systems. We will start by detailing the
composition and topology of modern video surveillance
systems. Next will understand the goals of an attacker by
discussing them in terms of their affect on the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of the system. Afterwards,
we will explore how an attacker can realize his/her goal
through multiple attack steps involving different threat
agents and malicious actions. We will exemplify these at-
tacks will current events and published common vulnera-
bility exposures (CVE). Finally, we will review best practices
and known security solutions which can be used to help
mitigate these cyber threats.
We note that many other works have performed com-
prehensive reviews of IoT security [3], [4], [5]. Although,
IP-based surveillance systems use similar technologies, they
are different with regards to cyber security. This is be-
cause surveillance systems are cyber-physical systems: they
virtually support and enforce our physical security. When
compromised, there is a threat to our physical safety, at
home, at work, or in a national sense. As a result, the
technology, threat actors, and attack motivations differ from
other IoTs:
Threat Actors (who) There are attackers which want to ex-
ploit the functionality of these systems specifically. For
example, state-actors or thieves performing reconnais-
sance over a geographic area and criminals planning to
blackmail a victim with video footage.
Assets (what) If compromised these systems can provide
an attacker with private imagery resulting in a direct
explicit violation of privacy. These systems are also
lucrative assets to botnet owners since they typically
have high bandwidth (for DDoS attacks) and decent
compute capabilities (for cryptomining).
Topology (where) Unlike other IoTs, surveillance systems
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2are often centralized systems connected to a single
server. They are also commonly connected to both the
Internet and an internal private networks –thus expos-
ing a potential infiltration vector.
Motivation (why) Aside from being a stepping stone into
another network, surveillance systems elicit monetary
motivations such as blackmail, cryptomining, and spy-
ing for military or political reasons. Moreover, an at-
tacker can have a physical advantage if the system
is targeted in a DoS attack. For example, stopping
video-feeds in certain geographic areas prior to an
attack/theft, or as an act of cyber terrorism.
Attack Vectors (how) These systems have often unique se-
curity flaws due to their functionality. For example,
surveillance video servers often try to be open-platform
and compatible with many different camera models.
As a result, these servers often use obsolete encryption
suites, and accept self-signed certificates which can
lead to man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, modern
systems rely on machine learning algorithms to identify
and track objects and people. Unlike AI on other IoTs,
these AI models can easily evaded/exploited due to
their accessibly and flaws [6].
We also note that here is a good security review of
CCTV and Video Surveillance Systems in [7]. However, in
[7] the authors focus on visual attacks such as data exfil-
tration, covert channels, and steganography. In this survey,
we provide the reader with a systematic review of the
security of modern surveillance systems. We provide a com-
prehensive enumeration and description of vulnerabilities
and attacks which pertain to surveillance systems. We hope
that this systematic survey will provide the reader with
a good understanding of how these systems are and can
be exploited. We also discuss emerging threats and future
research direction.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Before we can discuss the security aspects, we must describe
what a surveillance system is. In this section, we first present
a general overview of IP-based video surveillance systems.
Afterwards, we list some of the system’s critical assets and
common deployment schemes.
2.1 Overview
To get a better understanding of IP-based video surveillance
systems, in Fig. 1 we present an overview of their concepts.
In general, a system can be described in terms of its purpose,
implementation, topology, and protection. We will now
detail each of these aspects.
Purpose The purpose of a video surveillance system de-
pends on the user’s needs.
Enforcement The user may want to send security
forces or police to an area undergoing some violation
of law or protocol. This is common in governments,
transportation services, stores, and even workplaces.
Monitoring The user may want to know what is hap-
pening in a certain location for some general purpose,
or to have a sense of security. For example, home,
baby, and pet monitoring.
Forensics The user may want to be able to produce
evidence or track down an individual.
Operations The user may want to improve operations
by having an overview of what is going on. For
example, employees can be guided or managed more
efficiently.
Deterrent The user may want to have the system vi-
sually present to simply ward off potential offenders
or trespassers. In some cases, the user will not even
have a means of viewing the video footage.
Implementation There are various ways the hard-
ware/software of the system can be setup to collect and
interpret the video footage. We categorize the system’s
implementation into two categories:
Monitoring This concept regards how the user visual-
izes the video streams, and how the content is inter-
preted. The visualization can be provided directly to
the user directly such as in a closed circuit monitoring
station, or indirectly via a digital video recorder
(DVR) with remote access or in the cloud. The in-
terpretation of the content can be done manually by
a human user reviewing the content, or automatically
via motion detection, or advanced applications such
as object tracking, image recognition, face-detection,
and event-detection.
Communication The refers to the means in which the
system transports the video feeds. With analog meth-
ods, the video is sent to the DVR as an analog signal
(which is subsequently connected to Internet). With
digital methods, the video is processed, compressed,
and then sent as a packet stream to the DVR via IPv4
and IPv6 network protocols. A common approach is
to compress the stream with the H.264 codec and then
send it over the network with a real-time protocol
such as RTP over UDP.
Topology An IP-based surveillance system’s topology can
be described by its distribution, containment, and in-
frastructure. Distribution refers to whether the cameras
are located anywhere in the world or physically located
in one area. Containment refers to whether the system
is closed circuit (not connected to the Internet) or open
circuit –and relies on access control to deny users with-
out proper credentials. Finally, infrastructure refers to
how the elements of the system are connected together:
wireless (e.g., Wi-Fi), wired (e.g., Ethernet via CAT6
cables), or both.
Protection The protection of surveillance system refers to
how the user secures physical and virtual access to the
system’s assets and services. Without physical protec-
tion, an attacker can tamper/damage the cameras or
install his/her own equipment on the network. Virtual
protection can be employed on the network hosts or on
the network itself:
Host Cameras, DVRs, and other devices can be pro-
tected by using proper access control mechanisms.
However, like any computer, these devices are subject
to the exploitation of un/known vulnerabilities in the
software, hardware, or simply due to user misconfig-
uration (e.g., default credentials) [2]. Protecting the
hosts from attacks may involve anti-virus software
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Fig. 1: An Overview of Video Surveillance Systems
or other techniques.
Network Depending on the topology, access to the
system’s devices may be gained via the DVR, an
Internet gateway, or directly via the Internet. A user
may protect the devices and the system as a whole
by securing the network via encryption, firewalls,
and end-to-end virtual private network connections
(VPN).
2.2 Assets
An asset is a thing of value which may be targeted by an
attacker. In our case, the assets are data, devices, software,
and infrastructure:
DVR - Media Server The digital video recorder, or other
media server, which is responsible for receiving, stor-
ing, managing, and viewing the recorded/archived
video feeds. DVRs are typically an application running
on the user’s server, or a custom hardware Linux box.
DVRs can also be a cloud based server. In a small
system, there may be cameras which do not support
a DVR, and require the user to connect to the camera
directly (e.g., via web interface).
Cameras The devices which capture the video footage.
There are many types, brands, and models of IP-
Cameras, each of one has its own capabilities, function-
alities, and vulnerabilities. For configuration, some IP
cameras provide web-based interfaces (HTTP, Telnet,
etc) while others connect to a server in the cloud.
Most camera act as a web servers which provide video
content to authorized clients (e.g., the DVR will connect
to the camera as a client).
Viewing Terminal The device/application used to connect
to the DVR or camera in order to view and manage
the video content. For example, an Android application
running on a smartphone or the DVR itself.
Network Infrastructure The elements which connect the
cameras to the DVR, and DVR to the user’s viewing ter-
minal. For example, routers, switches, cables, etc. The
infrastructure also includes Virtual Private Network
(VPN) equipment and links. VPNs are LANs which
tunnel Layer 2 (Ethernet) traffic across the Internet,
between gateways and user devices, using encryption.
Site-to-site VPNs can bridge two segments of a the
surveillance network over the Internet. A remote-site
connection tunnels traffic directly from a user’s termi-
nal to the surveillance network.
Video Content The video feeds which are being recorded
or that have been archived for later viewing.
User Credentials The user names, passwords, cookies, and
authentication tokens used to gain access to the DVR,
cameras, and routers. The credentials are used to au-
thenticate users and determine access permissions of
video content, device configurations, and other assets.
Network Traffic - Data in Motion Data being transmitted
over the network infrastructure. This can be credentials,
video content, system control data [8] (e.g., pan, tilt, or
zoom), and other network protocols (ARP, DNS, HTTP,
SSL, TCP, UDP, etc).
2.3 Deployments
There are several ways an IP-based surveillance system can
be deployed. The the network topologies can be centralized
(all cameras connect to a DVR) or distributed (the user con-
nects to each individual camera). In terms of accessibility,
the system can being/directly accessible via the Internet,
or not at all. In this regard, we identify three categories of
accessibility (visualized in Fig. 2):
4Classic MitM: An attacker reroutes traffic
Active Wiretap: An attacker physically intercepts traffic
Tx
Rx
Monitoring RoomDVR
Internet
VPN tunnel
Physically Closed Circuit (PCC): The 
network hosts have private IP addresses, 
and there is a physical disconnect
• Security
• Surveillance
• SECveillance : a survey of security 
on IP camera video surveillance 
systems Monitoring RoomDVR
Internet
smartphone
Monitoring RoomDVR
Internet
Physically Open Circuit (POC): The 
network hosts have public IP addresses
Virtually Closed Circuit (VCC): The network hosts have private IP addresses, and 
there is a virtual disconnect
Fig. 2: Accessibility models for deploying a video surveil-
lance system.
Physically Open Circuit (POC) When the network hosts in
the system (cameras, DVR, etc) have public IP ad-
dresses. This means that anybody from Internet can
send packets to the devices.
Physically Closed Circuit (PCC) When the network hosts
in the system have private IP addresses, and there is
no infrastructure which connects the network to the
Internet. This means that nobody from Internet can
send packets to the devices directly. These systems are
also called air-gapped networks [9].
Virtually Closed Circuit (VCC) When the network hosts in
the system have private IP addresses, and the network
is connected via the Internet using a VPN. This means
that nobody from Internet can send packets to the
devices directly, unless they send packets via the VPN.
3 SECURITY VIOLATIONS
A security violation can be described as an attack on the
system’s confidentiality, integrity and availability (known
as the CIA triad). A violation of confidentiality refers to the
unauthorized access of information. A violation of integrity
refers to the intentional manipulation and alteration of
information. Finally, A violation of availability refers to the
act of preventing authorized users from accessing services
or resources when needed.
The goals which an attacker may have in assaulting the
system, can be described in terms of the CIA triad:
1) Confidentiality Violation - the unauthorized access
of video content, user credentials, network traffic. In
this case, the attacker intends to observe the video
footage for his/her own nefarious purposes. As a result,
this goal puts the privacy and physical security of the
premises at risk.
2) Integrity Violation - the manipulation of video content,
or the active interference of a secure channels in the
system (e.g., the POODLE SSL downgrade attack). In
this case, the attacker intends to alter the video content
(at rest or in transit). Alteration can include freezing
frame, looping an archived clip, or inserting some other
content. This misinformation can lead to physical harm
or theft.
An attacker may violate a system’s integrity for a goal
which is not directly related to the video content. For
example, the attacker may want to exploit the system’s
vulnerabilities to gain lateral movement to external as-
sets. The system may be used as a stepping stone to
gain access to the following external assets:
a) Internal network - surveillance systems (especially
closed circuit systems) may be connected to the or-
ganization’s internal network for management pur-
poses. An attacker may leverage this link in order to
gain access to the organization’s internal assets.
b) Users - users of the system may be targeted by the
attacker. For example, the attacker may wish to install
ransomware on the viewing terminal, or to hijack a
the user’s personal accounts.
c) Recruiting a Botnet - A ‘bot’ is an automated process
running on a compromised computer which receives
commands from a hacker via a command and con-
trol (C&C) server. A collection of bots is reffed to
as a botnet, and are commonly used for launching
DDoS attacks, mining crypto currencies, manipulat-
ing online services, and performing other malicious
activities. An example botnet which infected affected
IP-cameras and DVRs was the Mirai malware bot-
net. In 2016, the Mirai botnet generated a 1.1Tbps
DDoS attack against websites, webhosts, and service
providers.
3) Availability Violation - the denial of access to stored
or live video feeds. In this case, the attacker’s goal is
to (1) disable one or more camera feeds (hide activity),
(2) delete stored video content (remove evidence), or
(3) launch a ransomeware attack (earn money). For
example, the attack on Washington DC’s surveillance
system in 2017 [10].
4 ATTACKS
There are many different kinds of attacks. Some scenarios
involve a single step (e.g., DDoS a VPN link), while others
have numerous steps (e.g., stealing credentials by sending
a phishing email, then installing a malware, and so on). A
sequence of attack steps is often referred to as an attack
vector. Each step in the vector gives the attacker access
to some asset, and the final step in the vector fulfills the
attacker’s goal. As an example, Fig. 3 illustrates two attack
vectors which arrive at the same goal: Attack 1 achieves
an outcome which compromises an asset. As a result, the
attacker can either perform Attack 2 or 3 to achieve the
goal. Alternatively, the attacker may perform Attack 2 with
directly achieves the goal in one step, but may be more
difficult to accomplish.
To understand an attack vector, one needs to investigate
the following aspects:
Threat Agent/Actor. The person, device, or code which per-
forms an attack step on behalf of the attacker.
Threat Action. The malicious activity which an agent can
perform at each step (access, misuse, modify, etc.)
5Threat Consequence/Outcome. What the attacker obtains
at the successful completion of an attack step.
Attack Goal. The ultimate outcome which the attacker is
trying to achieve (at the end of the attack vector).
We will now discuss each of these aspects with regards
to the surveillance system.
4.1 Threat Agents
We identify the following relevant threat agents/actors:
1) Hacker - An individual who is experienced at exploit-
ing computer vulnerabilities, whose unauthorized ac-
tivities violate the system’s security policies. A Hacker
can be in a remote location (i.e., the Internet) or in close
proximity of physical network.
2) Network Host - A computer connected to the system’s
network which is executing malicious code. The com-
puter can be an IP-camera, DVR, or any programmable
device in the network. A network host can become a
threat actor via local exploitation (the un/intentional
instillation of malware – social engineering & insiders),
remote exploitation (e.g., exploit a web server vulnera-
bility or an open telnet server), or a supply chain attack.
3) Insider - An authorized user of the system who is the
attacker or colluding with the attacker. The insider may
be a regular user (e.g., security officer), an IT support
member, or even the system’s administrator. An insider
may directly perform the entire attack, or enable a por-
tion of an attack vector by installing malware, changing
access permissions, etc.
4.2 Threat Actions
We identify the following assaults which a threat agent can
perform on the system.
4.2.1 Performing Code Injection
Code injection is an exploitation of improper parsing of
an input which results in the input being executed as
code. A threat agent may perform a code injection to re-
veal sensitive information or install some malware. One
example is the cross-site request forgery (CSRF) flaw which
can be used to add a secondary administrator account
on some cameras (for example CVE-2018-7524, CVE-2018-
7512). Another example is the SQL injection attack which
have affected Geutebruck G-Cam/EFD-2250 cameras (CVE-
2018-7528). Finally, stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities have been exploited, and have been discovered in IP-
cameras and DVRs (CVE-2017-16725).
Some cameras, run local HTTP web servers to provide
users with a convenient configuration interface. However,
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Fig. 3: An example of two attack vectors which arrive at the
same goal.
these servers may be outdated and vulnerable to attack,
such as the infamous Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL.
Another example is the Sony surveillance camera IPELA
series, where parsing vulnerabilities can be exploited to
perform a buffer overflow attack via a simple HTTP post
message (CVE-2018-3937/8). Other attacks on web servers
found on IP-cameras include directory traversals and cgi-
bin script exposures. Crafted URLs sent to the server can
cause directory traversals which may reveal administrator
and Wi-Fi credentials (CVE-2013-2560). Sending various in-
puts to exposed cgi-bin script URLs can enable live video
feeds and enable telnet communications [11].
4.2.2 Manipulating/Observing Traffic
A threat agent may manipulate, reroute, or observe network
traffic. For example, an agent may (1) perform a man-in-
the-middle (MitM) attack in the local network, and then (2)
freeze a video image or injected into a live feed. For the
MitM attack, the attacker could reroute traffic through him
via ARP poisoning, DHCP/DNS spoofing. For injection, the
tool VideoJak may be used to exploit unencrypted video
streams using the RTSP or RTP protocols. These protocols
are commonly used in video surveillance systems, and may
be left unencrypted if found in a PCC deployment.
In the case of traffic observation, an agent may be able
to observe video content. In [12] the authors succeeded in
extracting JPEG images generated by NetCam IP Camera
by sniffing the network traffic. Furthermore, even when the
video stream is encrypted, the video footage can be inferred
by observing the stream’s bandwidth patterns [13]. This is
due to how video codecs (such as H.264) compress motion
between frames, and how clients buffer content. Moreover,
observing traffic can also reveal network topological infor-
mation from universal plug and play (UPnP) traffic, and
credentials may be revealed as plain text in HTTP traffic
(e.g., the DVR in CVE-2017-15290).
4.2.3 Exfiltrating Information
Cameras can be exploited to exfiltrate information for an
attacker [7]. For example, a malware contained within an
isolated network can blink an LED light in view of the
camera which is connected to the Internet. By modulating
the blinking pattern, the attacker can ex filtrate some stolen
information (e.g., user credentials) to a remote location.
4.2.4 Flooding & Disrupting
A threat agent may prevent access to a service or data by
send flooding the network with packets, or sending crafted
traffic to a network application. A classic DoS attack is to
flood a DVR or Camera until the server’s resources are
depleted and all new (and sometimes existing) sessions
are blocked (e.g., CVE-2019-6973). For example, using the
hping3 tool, a TCP SYN flood can disable a web server (e.g.,
CVE-2018-9158), a UDP flood can overload a etwork inter-
face, and an ISKAMP flood can disable a VPN connection.
Furthermore, an SSDP amplification attack can be used to
overload a DVR. In this attack, the agent causes the cameras
to spam the DVR with large amounts of UPnP meta-data by
sending requests using the DVR’s IP address.
IP-cameras are often susceptible to these attacks because
they are typically resource limited devices. For example,
6some cameras can only support up to 80 concurrent HTTP
connections, which can easily be consumed. Another exam-
ple an SSL regeneration attack where the agent repeatedly
requests key renegotiations which overloads the device’s
CPU.
Other DoS attacks can be accomplished by exploiting
bugs and vulnerabilities. For example, a camera can be
crashed by sending large HTTP POST requests (CVE-2018-
6479), and a VPN router can be forced to drop all connec-
tions due to crafted packets (CVE-2014-0674 and CVE-2016-
6466).
4.2.5 Scanning & Reconnaissance
A threat agent may perform a network scan to learn the
topology, assets, open network ports, and services available
for potential exploitation. Off the shelf tools such as NMAP
can be used to map the network and reveal information
about its hosts. An agent may also elicit responses from
web services to reveal version information, and perform
fuzzing attacks on exposed web interfaces to find potential
vulnerabilities. Fuzzing is typically performed off-site since
it is easy to detect.
4.2.6 Exploiting a Misconfiguration
A threat agent may utilize a misconfiguration to install
malware or gain access to sensitive data. Example mis-
configuratiosn include default credentials, exposed services
(e.g., Telnet), and improper access control rules. A miscon-
figuration can be caused by a user of the system or the
manufacturer.
4.2.7 Performing a Brute-Force Attack
A brute-Force attack is the attempt of guessing a correct
input by trying many possible options. Brute-Force attacks
can be used to reveal user credentials such as user names
and passwords. These attacks can be mitigated by limiting
the number of failed logins allowed per minute. However,
in some cases, camera manufactures do not implement this
security feature. To arrive at a solution quickly, a dictionary
of common passwords may be used as a guessing pool. For
example, the Mirai malware propagated to other devices
by connecting via Telnet using a dictionary of 62 common
credentials used by cameras, DVRs, and IoTs alike [2].
Another example, is the Remaiten and Aidra malwares which
compromised cameras and other IoT devices using a similar
approach [8].
4.2.8 Social Engineering
Social Engineering (SE) refers to psychological manipulation
of a person which causes him/her to perform an action
on behalf of the attacker. Common SE attacks include
phishing emails and baiting. In phishing, the threat agent
sends a message (email, SMS, etc) disguised as trustworthy
source, in an attempt to get the receiver to install some
malware, or ultimately reveal user credentials. In baiting,
the threat agent plants a multimedia device (e.g., USB drive
or microSD card) loaded with malware. The victim then
unwittingly plugs it into his machine which infects it.
4.2.9 Physical Access
Physical access is where a threat agent performs an attack
which requires direct physical contact with the system. For
example, installing a wiretap, backdoor device, accessing a
terminal in the server room, flashing a camera’s firmware,
obstructing the camera’s view, or simply cutting a wire.
4.2.10 Reverse Engineering
A threat agent may learn the target device’s credentials
or vulnerabilities by the use of reverse engineering (RE).
Reverse engineering is typically performed off-site using
the same hardware/software used by the victim. RE is the
process of analyzing compiled code or hardware to identify
system’s components and their interrelationships. During
this process, vulnerabilities and even hard-coded credentials
can be discovered.
One approach is to analyze the pre-compiled firmware
provided by the manufacturer. In a Black Hat lecture [14]
the authors focused on IP cameras which face the Internet
and analyze them through firmware images supplied by the
camera’s vendors. The authors found zero-day vulnerabil-
ities in digital surveillance equipment from various firms
including D-Link Corp, Cisco Systems, Linksys, TRENDnet,
and more with the use existing tools. The analysis revealed
serious security vulnerabilities such as administrative pass-
words, remote code execution vulnerabilities, and more. An-
other case was found in Sony’s IPELA surveillance camera
series. By performing RE on the firmware, researchers from
Sec Consult found a backdoor via two hard coded root level
credentials. These backdoors have also been discovered in
other cameras and DVRs (In CVE-2018-5723 and CVE-2017-
6432). The hard-coding of credentials may occur intention-
ally, or by mistake (e.g., a developer forgot to remove the
credentials after testing).
Another approach of RE is to interface with the de-
vice via its Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
(UART) ports. These ports are typically inside the device’s
casing, and used by the manufacturer for debugging pur-
poses. UART ports can be used to expose vulneabilites, gain
access to the firmware, run foreign applications, extract sen-
sitive information, or upload custom firmware for further
analysis.
4.2.11 Adversarial Machine Learning
Video surveillance requires either a manual or automated
way of reviewing the video content for events. For example,
detecting live intrusions or locating suspects. Therefore,
the domain of video analytics have been applied to
minimize the human efforts in this task. In the case of large
deployments, such as China’s state surveillance system, (see
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/technology/china-
surveillance-state.html) automated methods are required.
Some automated technologies include, facial recognition
[15], event detection [16], and object tracking [17]. However,
since most of these technologies rely on machine learning,
they are susceptible to adversarial attacks [6]. An adversarial
attack is where a machine learning model is abused by
either (1) poisoning the model during training so that
the mode will behave according to the attacker’s will,
(2) crafting an input which will yield an unexpected
7output, or (3) learning the training data or the model itself
by observing the input-output relationship. Adversarial
attacks on these technologies mean that an attacker may be
able to evade detection, falsify the recognition of an object,
or even cause a DoS attack by raising the technology’s false
positive rate.
4.3 Threat Consequence
The success of an assault during an attack step provides the
attacker with new capabilities. For example access to new
assets, the ability to run code, and the ability to perform
new attacks. We identify the following as the primary threat
consequences:
4.3.1 Privilege Escalation
An attacker may receive new credentials or execute code
in a way that provides access to previously restricted as-
sets. This escalation can be used to gather information,
un/install software, en/disable a protection mechanism, etc.
For example, an unprotected web facing CGI method can
give an unauthenticated user the ability to bypass the login
screen and access the webcam contents including: live video
stream, configuration files with all the passwords, system
information, and much more (CVE-2017-17101). Another
example is CVE-2017-6432 where one can inject new users
into DVR management traffic via a MitM attack.
4.3.2 Access to Video Footage
The attacker may be able to watch/download live or pre-
recorded video footage.
4.3.3 Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
A significant security threat which enables an attacker to
execute any command on a target machine or within a
target process. As a result, the attacker can perform privilege
escalation, install malware, steal data, and perform other
malicious tasks. ACE vulnerabilities have been discovered
on IP cameras, DVRs and VPN routers(for example: CVE-
2018-6414, CVE-2018-9156, CVE-2018-9157, CVE-2018-7532,
CVE-2018-7512, CVE-2015-8039, CVE-2018-0125, CVE-2017-
3882).
4.3.4 Installation of Malware
The attacker may be able to install and execute his own
process on a target device. This software is referred to as
malware: malicious code designed to damage a computer
with malicious intent. Types of malware include worms,
trojan horses, viruses, spyware, scarewares, launchers, ran-
someware, adware, and rootkits. Malware can be used to
steal sensitive data, encrypt or delete user data, harm the
device, mine crypto currencies, add the device to botnet,
or act as a pivot point for lateral movement through the
victim’s network.
4.3.5 Lateral Movement
An attacker may again a stronger foothold in the surveil-
lance system, and achieve the ability to reach previously
inaccessible assets. The attacker may also be able to reach
other systems and infect user devices connected to the
system.
4.3.6 Man in the Middle (MitM)
An attacker may be able to covertly observe and manipulate
traffic between two or more endpoints. A MitM can harm
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triad) of
the system. For example, the MitM can eavesdrop, manipu-
late, craft, or drop network traffic.
4.3.7 Denial-of-Service (DoS)
An attacker may be able to affect the availability of a service,
data, or resource. If the attacker has compromised cameras
or the DVR, then attacker can cause a camera stop transmit-
ting video content, delete historic content, block access to
the DVR, or cause a VPN link to fail. As a result, a crime
may be accomplished on premises without digital evidence.
An attacker may also be able to evade detection without
raising any alerts in the DVR. This can be accomplished via
a video injection attack or an adversarial machine learning
attack.
With regards to DDoS attacks: an attacker may target
the surveillance network with a remote botnet. In this case,
the consequence of not filtering the traffic is a DoS to the
system. We also note that in the case where system itself is
infected with a botnet, and is then used to launch a remote
DDoS attack, the consequence may still be a DoS to the local
system since there will be congestion and the ISP may block
the system from network access.
4.3.8 Access to an Isolated Network
In some cases, the DVR is connected to the Internet (POC
or VCC) and is also connected to a network which is
supposedly isolated the Internet (e.g., airports, hospitals,
factories, etc.) By compromising the DVR or one of the
cameras, the attacker can perform lateral movement into the
isolated network. For example, two researchers hacked into
a Google office building’s air-conditioning system portal
and then gained access to the internal network [18].
4.4 Example Attack Vectors
In this section we provide example attack vectors for dif-
ferent scenarios. Although there are many possible attack
vectors, we will illustrate a small sample of common vec-
tors used to attack IP-based surveillance systems. For the
illustrations, we use the template presented in Fig. 3.
4.4.1 Unauthorized Video Monitoring
Consider an attacker who wants to view the video footage of
a POC deployment with encrypted traffic. In Fig. 4a, a few
potential attack vectors are illustrated. A state actor may
perform a BGP MitM routing attack, and cause all of the
video surveillance traffic to pass through them first. Next,
the attacker may exploit the Heartbleed vulnerability to
get the SSL cryptographic keys and then decrypt the video
traffic. A simpler way might be to get the camera’s or DVR’s
login credentials by performing a brute-force login attack, or
to send phishing emails to users of the system to have them
unwittingly reveal their credentials.
8(a) Unauthorized Video Monitoring: POC Deployment
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(b) Stealing Archived Video Footage: POC Deployment
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(c) Accessing an Air-Gapped System: PCC Deployment
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(d) Disabling Video Feeds: VCC Deployment
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Fig. 4: Example attack vectors on IP-based surveillance cam-
era systems deployed with POC, PCC, and VCC topologies.
4.4.2 Stealing Archived Video Footage
Another scenario is the case where an attacker wants
to blackmail an individual by obtaining sensitive video
footage. Fig. 4d we illustrates one possible attack vector
where an agent gains access to the DVR’s terminal by per-
forming a dictionary brute-force login attack on the DVR’s
telnet server. Next, the attacker retrieves the desired footage
and exfiltrates it out of the network.
4.4.3 Accessing an Air-Gapped System
In the case of a PCC deployment, direct access from the
Internet is impossible. However, this does not meant that
the network is impervious to infiltration. In Fig. 4c, we
illustrate how an attacker can install malware on one of the
user devices, such as a viewing terminal (tablet, console,
etc.) This can be accomplished by surreptitiously placing
an infected USB drive in the area, or by recruiting an
insider. Next, the malware will be installed by the threat
agent, which will then subsequently can and connect to
the surveillance network. At this point, the malware may
perform automated actions designed by the attacker (e.g.,
disable camera at a certain time) or it may be able to
communicate with the attacker directly via bridgeware [9].
4.4.4 Disabling Video Feeds
An attacker can disable video feeds in many different ways.
Let’s assume that the target system has a VCC deployment,
so access is either physical or via a VPN gateway. In Fig. 4b,
we show how an attacker can disable on , all, or a subset
of cameras in his scenario. First, an attacker may plant
a backdoor device to gain remote entry (e.g., under the
pretext of a repairmen, the attacker secretively connects a
raspberry Pi to the network, a d then connecting to the Pi’s
Wi-Fi access point). Next, the attacker ill have the device,
scan the network to reveal the IP addresses of the cameras
and the DVR. Finally, single cameras are disabled via TCP
SYN flooding, or all cameras are disabled by exploiting a
potential SSP flood vulnerability in the DVR. Alternatively,
instead of planting a backdoor device, the attacker may be
able to perform a flood attack (e.g., ISAKMP flood) on a
site-to-site VPN gateway which will result in a set of nearby
cameras to go off-line.
5 COUNTERMEASURES & BEST PRACTICES
In the following section we review existing countermeasures
and best practices which can be used to protect modern
surveillance systems.
5.0.1 Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems
Basic cyber defense should be considered in every computer
network. For example, to detect and prevent malware infec-
tions, anti-virus software should be installed on the user
terminals and DVRs. In non-distributed POC topologies,
a strict firewall should be deployed to pass the minimal
network traffic required to use the system (e.g., block telnet,
ICMP ‘ping’ packets, etc). Encase the adversary evades the
firewall, a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) can
be used to detect malicious traffic patterns. In this case, free
NIDS such as Snort and Suricata, or commercial software,
can be used.
5.0.2 Configurations & Encryption
One should carefully review the configurations of the cam-
eras, routers, terminals, and DVR. For example, weak or
default passwords should be changed, and different pass-
words should be used among different devices if possible.
Moreover, APIs and other similar features should be dis-
ables if not needed. It is also important to enable secure
communication wherever possible, and to ensure that de-
vices are not using self-signed SSL certificates (a common
default setting). Finally, one should periodically check for
new CVEs that the software/firmware of all devices are up
to date.
95.0.3 Restrict Physical Access
The most basic perimeter defense is to restrict physical
access to the system’s assets. If possible, wiring should
not pass through public areas, all networking equipment
(switches, routers, etc.) should be protected under lock-and-
key, and access to the system should be managed, logged,
and monitored.
5.0.4 Defense against DoS attacks
There are many protocols and vulnerabilities can be abused
to perform a DoS attack. As a result, there are many different
defense mechanisms which can be deployed. Good pro-
tection involves the following steps: (1) detect the attack’s
initiation, (2) select the malicious/harmful packets, and (3)
filter/log the detected packets. For the attack detection,
machine learning and statistical methods can be used –such
as light weight anomaly detection.
5.0.5 Defense against MitM Attacks
Proper encryption should be used to prevent eavesdropping
and packet manipulation (e.g., injecting video) as a result
of a MitM attack. However, sometimes vulnerabilities are
discovered in encryption protocols, and systems may be
misconfigured. Therefore, as an additional line of defense,
additional methods can be deployed. To detect tamper-
ing (video injection), one can reference time according to
shadow positions. However, this method only works in
limited circumstances. Another method is to perform wa-
termarking [19]: a process of embedding a digital code into
digital video sequences. When the video content is altered
the watermark is significantly affected which alerts the
receiver. To detect an eavesdropper or the presence of a third
party with the ability to manipulate traffic, one can perform
echo analysis to detect when malicious parties intercept
traffic [20].
5.0.6 Education
In many advanced persistent threats (APT) the initial intru-
sion comes in the form of a social engineering attack. The
most effective way of mitigating these initial incursions,
is to: (1) educate the users of the system of the potential
attack vectors, and (2) warn users to be careful of unsolicited
messages and requests made under false pretexts.
6 DISCUSSION
We have identified two main emerging threats to IP-based
video surveillance systems. The first is adversarial machine
learning (Section 4.2.11). Advanced machine learning tech-
niques, mainly based on deep learning, are being researched
and integrated within today’s video surveillance systems for
automating various tasks including: weapon detection [21],
fire detection [22], face recognition [23], and anomaly detec-
tion [24]. In parallel, there has been an increase of research
on adversarial machine learning [6] meaning that these
systems are vulnerable to attacks [25]. The second emerging
threat is how these systems are being infected and recruited
into botnets, leading to attacks on the internal network (e.g.,
data exfiltration, spying or using the surveillance system
for lateral movement) or on other external networks (e.g.,
DDoS, SPAM).
To address these threats, future work should focus on
protecting the machine learning algorithms and by mak-
ing them more resilient to adversarial machine learning
attacks [26], and by developing targeted security solutions
for video surveillance systems to improve their protection
against cyber-attacks.
New attacks are constantly emerging. As a result, a
recent research trend for securing surveillance systems
has been the use of advanced anomaly detection. With
anomaly detection researchers are able to identify man-
in-the-middle-attacks [20], video injection, OS fingerprint-
ing, fuzzing and ARP poisoning attacks [27], and DDoS
attacks [28].
Updating the software of such systems is also a chal-
lenging task since manufactures are focused on their next
product, and in many cases do not have the capability of
performing remote patching. Therefore, we believe future
research should focus on providing an external continuous
protection that can be easily updated with information on
newly discovered attacks. One way to collect intelligence
on emerging threats to surveillance systems is to use an
advanced honeypot system [29]. Moreover, by identifying
emerging exploits, administrators can protect their systems
before they get infected.
Finally, although in most cases the communication of
advanced video surveillance systems is encrypted, the confi-
dentially of entities can be compromised using side channel
attacks as was shown by Nassi et al. [30]. Therefore, future
research should focus on detecting and eliminating side
channels.
7 CONCLUSION
In this survey, we have reviewed the security of modern
video surveillance systems. We have presented an overview
of these systems, presented common deployments, and
listed the system’s assets. Using this information, we then
reviewed the security of these systems by exploring the sys-
tem’s attack surface, enumerating the attacker’s capabilities,
and by providing some example attack vectors. Finally, we
provided a concise summary of best practices and security
solutions which can be used to enhance the security. We
hope that this article will aid in securing existing and future
video surveillance systems.
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